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COMMENTS
THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE'S JURISDICTION OVER
POTENTIALLY PROTESTABLE CUSTOMS
SERVICE RULINGS: LOWA, LTD. v.
UNITED STATES
The decision in Lowa, Ltd. v. United States' is one of the
1 561 F. Supp. 441 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), aff'd, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The
plaintiff in Lowa, Ltd. v. United States had an airplane extensively refurbished while
abroad, and, in August 1979, brought it back to the United States. 561 F. Supp. at 442. The
plaintiff sought to file a consumption entry under item 694.40 of the Tarriff Schedules of the
United States (TSUS), which would have imposed a 5% ad valorem duty on the value
added to the aircraft by the refurbishing. Id. The Customs Service, operating under the
erroneous belief that the aircraft had been of American registry at the time the repairs were
made, refused to release the aircraft until a vessel repair entry was filed pursuant to 19
U.S.C. § 1466. Id. Section 1466, if applicable, would have imposed a 50% duty on the ex-
pense of the repairs. Id.; see also Suwannee Steamship Co. v. United States, 435 F. Supp.
389, 390-91 & n.1 (Cust. Ct. 1977) (shipowner required to pay an ad valorem duty of 50% of
the cost of foreign repairs).
After posting a bond to secure the release of the aircraft, "the plaintiff filed [a petition]
with the district director of Customs . . . seeking relief from the 50% vessel repair duty."
561 F. Supp. at 443. The plaintiff supplied additional information that showed that the
aircraft was not registered under the laws of the United States at the time the repairs were
made, and Customs concluded that the 50% duty did not apply. Id. In February, 1981,
however. Customs notified the plaintiff that it would be required to file an entry summary
for the aircraft. Id. The plaintiff subsequently filed an entry summary under item 694.41,
TSUS, which provided for entry free of duty. Id.
Commencing January 1, 1980, however, item 694.41 had superseded item 694.40, TSUS,
which provided for a 5% duty. Id. Customs notified plaintiff that the entry should be made
under item 694.40, the provision that applied during 1979 when the plaintiff's aircraft had
been released into United States commerce. Id. "[T]he plaintiff filed. . . a protest objecting
to the refusal by Customs to accept the entry under item 694.41," and Customs responded
with a letter stating that the protest was premature. Id. The plaintiff then commenced its
action before the Court of International Trade, and the Court granted the defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
For a more detailed discussion of the Lowa decision, see Cohen, Recent Decisions of the
Court of International Trade Relating to Jurisdiction-A Primer and a Critique, 58 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 700, 708-09 & nn.47-52 (1984); Vance, The Unrealized Jurisdiction of 28
U.S.C. § 1581(i): A View From the Plaintiff's Bar, 58 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 793, 810-13 & nn.
80-88 (1984).
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most recent pronouncements by the Court of International Trade
on its jurisdiction over potentially protestable Customs Service rul-
ings.2 As this Symposium demonstrates, a number of specialists in
international trade litigation believe that the "manifestly inade-
quate" standard applied by the Court mischaracterizes the rela-
tionship between section 1581(a) and section 1581(i).3 Critics of
Lowa generally adopt one of two diametrically opposed positions.
One view, advocated by David M. Cohen, Director of the Commer-
cial Litigation Branch of the Department of Justice, interprets sec-
tion 1581(i)(4) as inapplicable to potentially protestable decisions,
placing them outside the Court's residual jurisdiction.4 The oppos-
ing school of thought, promulgated by Andrew P. Vance, President
' See, e.g., Luggage and Leather Goods Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 18 CUST. B.
& DEC. No. 24, at 114-17 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (when special administrative remedies are
exhausted under the Generalized System of Preference established in the Trade Act of 1974,
plaintiffs are not required to file an essentially futile protest with the Customs Service to
gain § 1581(b) jurisdiction, and may properly maintain an action in the Court of Interna-
tional Trade under § 1581(i)); American Ass'n of Exporters and Importers v. United States,
583 F. Supp. 591, 596-97 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (dictum) (denied protests are not "absolute
precondition[s] to the Court of International Trade's exercise of subject matter
jurisdiction").
I See Cohen, supra note 1, at 760-74 nn. 350-435; Vance, supra note 1, at 810-12 nn.
80-89. It is important to note that, despite the disparate opinions on the efficacy of either a
broad or narrow grant of jurisdiction to the Coutt under § 1581(i), all commentators gener-
ally welcomed the Customs Courts Act of 1980 as a necessary overhaul in customs-related
adjudication. See, e.g., Cohen, The New United States Court of International Trade, 20
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 278, 293 (1981) (the Act represents "the first step in the develop-
ment of a true international trade court for the United States"); Note, The Customs Courts
Act of 1980-Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1785 (to be Codified in Scattered Sections of 19
and 28 U.S.C.), 7 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 85, 104 (1982) (the "result [of the Act] will be
a fairer and more public administration of U.S. trade law").
See Cohen, supra note 1, at -nnl. 481-82. Cohen foresaw the possibility that a legis-
lative reorganization of the Customs Court system might expand the Court's jurisdiction
beyond what some considered appropriate if the "natural inclination . . . to permit judicial
review in order to insure adherence to [established] rules" was not balanced against the
problems inherent in foreign affairs and against criteria established in previously developed
areas of judicial review. The Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, 84 F.R.D. 429, 528 (1979) (panel discussion on the Customs
Courts Act of 1979). However, Cohen acknowledged the overall desirability of judicial review
of administrative action. Id.
The general difficulty in permitting an administrative agency to render absolute, unre-
viewable decisions stems primarily from the dual role of the agency as prosecutor and adju-
dicator. See J. CHAMBERLAIN, N. DOWLING & P. HAYS, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIvE AGENCIES 209-10 (1969). Objectivity often suffers when the arbiter in a dis-
pute has a vested interest in the outcome. See id. Indeed, it is submitted that any diligent
administrator will be interested in strenuously upholding the rules he or she is charged with
enforcing. Even a well-structured internal administrative organization cannot fully solve the
problem; however, it is more likely that an independent judicial review will. See id. at 212.
1984] § 1581(i) JURISDICTION
of the Association of the Customs Bar, contends that potentially
protestable rulings may be heard by the Court so long as they in-
volve an actual case or controversy and practical exhaustion of
remedies has occurred.'
This Comment will suggest that the standard explicated in
Lowa is truer to the legislative intent of the Customs Courts Act of
1980 (Customs Courts Act or the Act) than either of the above al-
ternatives. This Comment will substantiate this claim by analyzing
the three approaches in light of the language of the Court's juris-
dictional statute, the relevant principles of administrative law, the
legislative history of the Customs Courts Act, and the case law de-
fining the boundaries of the Court's jurisdiction. The Comment
will conclude that Lowa strikes the most reasonable balance be-
tween the policies underlying the exhaustion of remedies require-
See Vance, supra note 1, at 814. The case or controversy requirement is a well known
element of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST., art. 3, § 2, cl. 1. One author posits
that the following factors are necessary to comprise a valid case or controversy:
(1) [T]he presence before the court of two or more adverse parties, (2) a contest as
to their respective rights or duties or both, (3) an adjudication by the application
of relatively firm principles characteristically presumed to exclude the exercise of
broad discretion, and (4) a decision not subject to subsequent revision by execu-
tive or legislature.
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS 99 (1965).
The exhaustion of administrative remedies prerequisite to judicial review of an agency
decision in the federal system has been characterized as "too rigid" and, has at times been
required "almost mechanically." Id. at 424. Basically, the motivation behind the rule is simi-
lar to that requiring a final decision in a lower court before appeal to a higher court can be
taken. Id. Preventing piecemeal resolution of diverse issues in several courts saves time,
money, and leads to more credible results. Id. at 424-25. Vance's requirement of only practi-
cal exhaustion, rather than actual exhaustion, softens the burden of total administrative
exhaustion, which is often required without regard to the futility of the effort, while retain-
ing the framework of the exhaustion doctrine. Id.; see Vance, supra note 1, at 814.
Vance is not completely alone in his position on § 1581(i) jurisdiction. See The First
Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
100 F.R.D. 499, 580-33 (1983) (Statement of Peter Gerhart). Although his ideas were more
general than those expressed by Vance in this Symposium, see Vance, supra note 1, 814,
Professor Gerhart did state that all § 1581 issues must be ripe: "the issue[s] must be con-
crete, [they] must be controverted, and [they] must be one[s] for which all the relevant facts
are before the decision maker." This view parallels Vance's case or controversy requirement
very closely. Id. at 582. Similarly, and perhaps more importantly, Gerhart agreed with the
basic requirement of an exhaustion of remedies, but, like Vance, believed that "the exhaus-
tion doctrine may be ignored if there is no administrative remedy to exhaust, and it may be
overridden if the need for a judicial remedy overrides the importance of allowing the admin-
istrator to first look at the question." Id. at 582-83. In fact, by concentrating on relative
importance rather than practical exhaustion as a guideline to when potentially protestable
issues may be brought before the Court, Gerhart advocated a position even more extreme
than that of Vance. See id.
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ment and the need to provide importers with meaningful access to
the Court in cases in which the protest remedy proves inadequate.
THE STATUTORY PROBLEM
The propriety of extending the Court's jurisdiction to poten-
tially protestable matters in which no protest has been filed re-
mains open to question, in part, because the language of section
1581 does not expressly address the issue. Section 1581(a), which
provides that "[t]he Court of International Trade shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to contest the de-
nial of a protest"6 is, by its terms, irrelevant to cases in which no
protest has been filed. Since the other subsections of section 1581
deal with particular types of cases that do not include potentially
protestable rulings,' section 1581(i)(4) is the only statute that the
Court conceivably could use as a basis for jurisdiction over such
rulings.
Section 1581(i)(4) states, in pertinent part:
In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of Inter-
national Trade by subsections (a)-(h) of this section .. . the
Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
any civil action commenced against the United States .. .that
arises out of any law of the United States providing for-
' 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982).
' See id. § 1581(b), 1581(i)(1)-(3). All of the above-cited subsections contain this state-
ment:"[t]he Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil ac-
tion." Id. Subsection (b) grants jurisdiction to the Court for actions commenced under § 516
of the Tariff Act of 1930, which deals with disputes over "the classification and the rate of
duty imposed upon designated imported merchandise." Id. § 1581(b); see 19 U.S.C. § 1516
(1982). Subsection (c) relates to § 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, which discusses counter-
vailing and antidumping duties. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1982); see U.S.C. § 1516(a) (1982).
Subsection (d)(1)-(3) confers jurisdiction to review final decisions by the Secretary of Labor
relating to the eligibility of workers, firms, and communities for adjustment assistance under
the Trade Act of 1974. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (d)(1)-(3) (1982); see 19 U.S.C. §§ 2273, 2341, 2371
(1982). Subsection (e) grants the Court the power to review final decisions authorized to be
made by the Secretary of the Treasury under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(e) (1982); see 19 U.S.C. § 2515(b)(1) (1982). Subsection (f) allows the Court to direct
the International Trade Commission, or other agencies, on applications to those agencies
requesting that confidential information be made available under the Tariff Act of 1930. 28
U.S.C. § 1581(f) (1982); see 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(c)(2) (1982). Subsection (g)(1)-(2) permits the
Court to review application denials and suspensions or revocations of customhouse broker's
licenses under the Tariff Act of 1930. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(g)(1)-(2) (1982); see 19 U.S.C. § 1641
(1982). Subsection (h) provides the Court with jurisdiction to review certain rulings of the
Secretary of the Treasury involving goods yet to be imported if the party initiating the suit
shows that "irreparable" harm will occur unless the ruling is changed. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h)
(1982).
[Vol. 58:839
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(4) administration and enforcement with respect to matters re-
ferred to in . . . subsections (a)-(h) of this section.'
Standing alone, this language appears to grant the Court juris-
diction over potentially protestable matters. However, before
reaching this conclusion, 28 U.S.C. § 2637 (section 2637), which de-
fines the extent to which exhaustion of administrative remedies is
required before the Court can take jurisdiction of a case, must be
consulted."
Section 2637(a) states, in pertinent part:
A civil action contesting the denial of a protest . . may be com-
menced in the Court of International Trade only if all liquidated
duties, charges, or exactions have been paid at the time the action
is commenced .... 10
This section, which uses the same language as section 1581(a),"
plainly refers to cases brought under that section. Section 2637(a)
is particularly relevant to the present analysis because it does not
require a protest to be filed in a case involving a potentially
protestable ruling for the Court to have jurisdiction. 12 The section
28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4) (1982).
9 Id. § 2637; see L. JAFFE, supra note 5, at 424-25. In addition to the Court's inadequacy
exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies required under § 1581(i), one com-
mentator has enumerated five other exceptions to the exhaustion rule. See Comment, Limit-
ing Judicial Intervention in Ongoing Administrative Proceedings, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 452,
458-67 (1980). These exceptions include cases involving questions of the jurisdiction of the
agency, attacks on the constitutionality of the action of the agency, examinations of poten-
tial international questions, resolutions of essentially legal questions, and cases of discre-
tionary waivers of the exhaustion requirement. Id. This commentator notes that "judicial
intervention reduces the stature and legitimacy of the administrative process" and might
eventually "encourag[e] litigants to by-pass or evade agency decisionmaking." Id. at 457.
Section 2637(b) states "[a] civil action contesting the denial of a petition under § 516 of
the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced . . . by a person who has first exhausted the
procedures set forth in such section." 28 U.S.C. § 2637(b) (1982). Clearly, this section and §
2637(c), which refers only to § 1581(h) and its provision granting the Court jurisdiction
when a ruling by the Secretary of the Treasury causes irrevocable harm to a future importa-
tion of goods, are both inapplicable to a discussion of whether any potentially protestable
but unprotested matters may ever be properly brought before the Court. Id. §§ 1581(h),
2637(c). Therefore, only subsections 2637(a) and 2637(d) need be considered here.
10 28 U.S.C. § 2637(a) (1982).
' See id. Section 2637(a) is very similar to § 1581(a), which states that "[tihe Court of
International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to con-
test the denial of a protest . . . under § 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930." Id. § 1581(a). More
important than the structural similarity between the two statutes is the fact that both refer
specifically to § 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, clearly evincing their common origin. Id. §§
1581(a), 2637(a); see 19 U.S.C. § 1515 (1982) (standards for review of a protested claim).
12 See 28 U.S.C. § 2637(a) (1982).
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simply provides that in those cases in which a protest is filed and
denied, any amounts assessed by Customs against the importer
must be paid before the Court can take jurisdiction. 13 Therefore, it
is submitted that section 2637(a) presents no jurisdictional impedi-
ment to the Court hearing those potentially protestable matters in
which no protest is filed because the relief available through the
administrative process is alleged to be inadequate.
Section 2637(d), which applies to cases arising under subsec-
tions 1581(d)-(i), grants the Court broad discretion to determine
when a party must exhaust its administrative remedies before
seeking judicial review. It provides that:
In any civil action not specified in this section, the Court of Inter-
national Trade shall, where appropriate, require the exhaustion of
administrative remedies. 14
The implication of this language is that the Court may take juris-
diction of a potentially protestable but unprotested matter under
the proper circumstances, because unprotested matters do not fall
into the group of cases referred to in section 1581(a) or section
2637(a), both of which address only "civil action[s] commenced to
contest the denial of a protest.' 1 5 Moreover, nothing in the lan-
guage of either section suggests that potentially protestable mat-
ters are automatically excluded from the purview of section
1581(i). Even if the "in addition to" language of section 1581(i) is
construed to exclude cases from the Court's residual jurisdiction
that are provided for in the other subsections of section 1581,16
potentially protestable matters are not excluded because they are
not provided for in any other subsection. It is submitted that to
argue otherwise is to ignore the time-honored principle of statutory
construction that the words of a statute bear their ordinary mean-
ing unless a contrary interpretation is indicated.1 7
" Id.; see infra note 17 (discussion of "plain meaning" rule).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) (1982).
" See id. §§ 1581(a), 2637(a).
" See Cohen, supra note 1, at 783-85; infra notes 75 & 77.
7 See generally Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REv.
509, 509-16 (1940) (broad background rationale supporting plain meaning rule). The "plain
meaning" rule provides that when "[an] act is clear upon its face, and when standing alone
it is fairly susceptible of but one construction, that construction must be given to it." Ham-
ilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 419 (1899); see also Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 122, 202-03 (1819) (the "plain meaning" of a provision in a statute should only be
discarded if the result of enforcing that meaning is "so monstrous, that all mankind would,
without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application").
[Vol. 58:839
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One of the major arguments raised in opposition to this con-
struction of section 1581(i) assumes that it provides no effective
check upon the Court's capacity to use this section to enlarge its
jurisdiction. It is submitted that such an assumption is unwar-
ranted. The exhaustion of remedies doctrine has been used by both
the Court and its predecessor tribunal, the Customs Court,'8 to
prevent an improper expansion of jurisdiction.
The Exhaustion of Remedies Doctrine
As Chief Judge Re observed in Lowa, it is a "long settled rule
of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief
for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed adminis-
trative remedy has been exhausted."' 9 In cases involving assess-
ments of duties on imported merchandise, the administrative rem-
edy is to file a protest with the Customs Service.20 What remains
open to debate is the extent to which the Court may accept such
cases if no protest has been filed, or if a protest has been filed but
has not been formally denied.
Four exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine have been recog-
nized and applied by the federal courts." Judicial review is permit-
ted without exhaustion of administrative appeals when: (1) the ad-
ministrative remedy would be inadequate to provide relief,22 (2)
pursuit of the administrative remedy would be futile,23 (3) the ag-
18 See generally Cohen, supra note 3, at 278-82 (history and background of the pre-
1980 customs court system).
'9 Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 561 F. Supp. 441, 448 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983) (quoting
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938)), aff'd, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
20 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514, 1515 (1982).
21 See 5 B. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 43.02[3], at 43-24 to 43-25, 49.02, at 49-7
to 49-29 (1984).
22 Id. § 49.02[1], at 49-7; see, e.g., Walker v. Southern Ry., 385 U.S. 196, 198-99 (1966)
(action by employee for money damages against railroad for wrongful discharge in violation
of collective bargaining agreement not barred by employee's failure to pursue administrative
remedies available under the Railway Labor Act), modified, 386 U.S. 988 (1967); Camenisch
v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 134 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (it is well-settled that the
exhaustion doctrine does not apply where there is no adequate administrative procedure
available), vacated on other grounds, 451 U.S. 390 (1981). See generally 5 B. MEziNES,
supra note 21, § 49.02[1].
13 5 B. MEZINES, supra note 21, § 49.02[4], at 49-26; see, e.g., McKart v. United States,
395 U.S. 195 (1969) ("[i]n Selective Service cases, the exhaustion doctrine must be tailored
to fit the peculiarities of the administrative system Congress has created"); New Jersey v.
Department of Health & Human Servs., 670 F.2d 1262, 1277 (3d Cir. 1981) (court recog-
nized that exhaustion of remedies doctrine "has traditionally been waived in those situa-
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grieved party would incur irreparable injury if required to await
administrative relief,24 and (4) the agency has exceeded its author-
ity.25 Since the exhaustion doctrine exists to prevent the courts
from improperly interfering with the creation of administrative
agency policy, 26 it is not applied to cases in which there is little
danger of intrusion upon agency prerogatives.2 7
tions where exhaustion would be futile") (quoting Susquehana Valley Alliance v. Three Mile
Island Nuclear Reactor, 614 F.2d 231, 245 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1069 (1981));
Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1967) (courts will disre-
gard doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies when there is nothing to be gained
from exhaustion). See generally 5 B. MEZINES, supra note 21, § 49.02[4].
24 5 B. MEZINES, supra note 21, § 49.02[2], at 49-20 to 49-23. See, e.g., Cerro Metal
Prods. v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 971 n.17 (3d Cir. 1980) (if case were normally subject to
exhaustion of remedies doctrine, court would find "that it comes within the long-established
exception when the prescribed administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate
to prevent irreparable injury"); Babcock and Wilcox Co. v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128, 1138
(3d Cir. 1979) (as a judicially-created doctrine, exhaustion of remedies is subject to an ex-
ception when the prescribed administrative procedure is clearly inadequate to prevent irrep-
arable injury); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Resor, 442 F.2d 993, 994-95 (3d Cir.
1971) ("if the prescribed administrative procedure is clearly . . . inadequate to prevent ir-
reparable injury,. . . a court need not defer decision until the conclusion of the administra-
tive inquiry"). See generally 5 B. MEZINES, supra note 21, § 49.02[2].
25 5 B. MEZINES, supra note 21, § 49.02[3], at 49-24; see, e.g., Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S.
184, 190-91 (1958) (federal district court had jurisdiction of an original suit to set aside
NLRB's decision because Board exceeded its authority); Coca-Cola Co. v. FTC, 475 F.2d
299, 303 (5th Cir.) ("most widely recognized exception to the general rule against judicial
consideration of. . .agency rulings is the class of cases where an agency has exercised au-
thority in excess of its jurisdiction") cert. denied, 414 U.S. 877 (1973). See generally 5 B.
MEZINES, supra note 21, § 49.02[3].
2 E.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1969) (primary purpose of ex-
haustion doctrine is to avoid premature interruption of administrative process); Von
Hoffburg v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 1980) ("the major purpose of the exhaus-
tion doctrine is to prevent the courts from interfering with the administrative process until
it has reached a conclusion"); Craycroft v. Ferrall, 408 F.2d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 1969) (one of
the purposes of the exhaustion rule is "to avoid interference with the orderly functioning of
the administrative process"), vacated on other grounds, 397 U.S. 335 (1970).
27 See 5 B. MEZINES, supra note 21, § 43.02[3], at 43-24. As the Ninth Circuit indicated
in Craycroft v. Ferrall, 408 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 397 U.S. 335
(1970),
[a] major premise supporting the requirement of exhaustion is that recourse
to the full administrative process might satisfactorily have resolved the debated
issues. Accordingly, it is unlikely that a court would require exhaustion if an ad-
ministrative body's actions constituted a readily discernible error of a type un-
likely to be corrected by further recourse to the administrative process and result-
ing in great injury to a party or to the public. It is also reasonable that a court
should relax the requirement of exhaustion in a case that can be decided only by
the determination of an issue not addressed to an area of administrative judg-
ment. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not required exhaustion when faced
with a record clearly revealing infringements on the first amendment right of free
expression that could not be fully and satisfactorily protected by requiring re-
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The Court has adopted most of these common-law exceptions
to the exhaustion requirement under the general label "manifestly
inadequate." In Lowa, for example, the Court expressly recognized
the inadequacy and irreparability of harm exceptions,2" and in
United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Association v. Block,2 9 the
court squarely embraced the futility exception . 0 Moreover, the
need for rigid adherence to the exhaustion requirement is lessened
in the area of international trade,3' in part, because the Court itself
is a tribunal that specializes in international trade. In addition, the
policy of ensuring the uniformity of regulations governing interna-
tional trade no longer necessitates judicial restraint on the part of
the Court, since the Court now has exclusive jurisdiction to review
Customs Service rulings and, therefore, for all practical purposes
uniformity has been achieved.2
The Legislative History of the Customs Courts Act of 1980
The brief legislative history of the Customs Courts Act de-
clares the main purpose of the Act to be "to provide for a compre-
hensive system of judicial review of matters directly affecting im-
ports, utilizing, wherever possible, the specialized expertise of the
United States Customs Court [now the Court of International
Trade] and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals [now the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit].''3" To this end, section
course to the administrative process.
Id. at 594-95.
23 Lowa, 561 F. Supp. at 448.
29 683 F.2d 399 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
:1 Id. at 402 n.5.
"' In League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Hampton, 501 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
the court listed, inter alia, two reasons for requiring the application of the exhaustion doc-
trine in most cases:
[A] plaintiff should be required to exhaust his administrative remedies so long as
resort to the agency is not obviously futile: . . .5. when the case presents compli-
cated and technical facts, the court should defer to the expertise and special
knowledge of the agency, 6. when the resolution of the issues depends on the in-
terpretation and application of the agency's regulations and the interest of uni-
formity the agency should be allowed to construe their own regulations.
Id. at 847, see also Sohm v. Fowler, 365 F.2d 915, 917-19 (D.C. Cir. 1966); infra notes 80-81
and accompanying text (main problem with uniformity of treatment of Customs Service
rulings was previous construction of the exhaustion doctrine by both Customs Court and
district courts).
32 See Customs Court Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201, 94 Stat. 1727, 1728-29; see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982).
22 Hearings on S. 2857 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
1984]
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1581(i) was drafted to "eliminate the confusion which [then] ex-
ist[ed] as to the demarcation between the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict courts and the Court of International Trade [and to] make it
clear that all suits of the type specified [in section 1581(i)] would
be properly instituted only in the Court of International Trade. '34
This sweeping grant of jurisdiction was qualified by the House Re-
port on the Act, which stated that subsection (i) created no new
causes of action.35
The insistence in the House Report that the Act created no
new causes of action does not, it is submitted, represent a fear that
the Court would attempt to overstep the statutory bounds of its
jurisdiction as much as it signals the purpose behind the grant of
residual jurisdiction. Before the Act was passed, a class of Customs
Service rulings existed that could properly be reviewed by the dis-
trict courts, but which lay outside the Customs Court's statutory
grant of jurisdiction. 6 Section 1581(i) was meant to bring these
cases within the purview of the Court of International Trade, not
to establish a new basis for importers to secure judicial review of
previously unreviewable rulings.3 7
The fact that the Act was not meant to increase the number of
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings on S. 2857].
11 S. REP. No. 466, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 466].
35 H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1980) [hereinafter cited as H. R. REP.
No. 1235].
" See, e.g., Cohen, The "Residual Jurisdiction" of the Court of International Trade
Under the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 471, 473-77 (1981). Compare
28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1976) (statute conferring jurisdiction on district court) with id. § 1582
(statute in force before 1980 conferring jurisdiction on Customs Court). Prior to the enact-
ment of the 1980 Act, it was often difficult to determine which court had jurisdiction to hear
a claim. See Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 77 F.R.D. 63, 182-90 (1977). This difficulty arose
because the statutes conferring jurisdiction upon the Customs Court provided a narrow defi-
nition of the circumstances in which suit could be instituted. Cohen, supra, at 474.
37 The Senate Report, echoing the Senate Hearings, states the purpose of § 1581(i) as
follows:
[T]he purpose of this broad jurisdictional grant is to eliminate the confusion
which currently exists as to the demarcation between the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict courts and the Court of International Trade. This residual jurisdictional pro-
vision should make it clear that all suits of the type specified are properly insti-
tuted only in the Court of International Trade . ...
S. REP. No. 466, supra note 34, at 3; see also Proposed Amendments to the Customs Court
Act: Hearings on H.R. 6394 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980) (remarks of Sen. DeCon-
cini) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on H.R. 6394].
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administrative rulings eligible for judicial review suggests a simple
test of the correctness of the Lowa doctrine: If the type of interna-
tional trade cases formerly heard only by the district courts is the
same type of cases over which the Court of International Trade has
asserted jurisdiction pursuant to section 1581(i)(4) and the Lowa
doctrine, that doctrine comports with the intent of the Act. There-
fore, pre-Act case law can be used to help ascertain the boundaries
of the Court's residual jurisdiction.
Pre-Act Case Law
In her testimony during the Senate hearings on the Customs
Courts Act, former Assistant Attorney General Babcock cited
Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter38 as an example of the type of case
that would come within the proposed grant of residual jurisdic-
tion." In Sneaker Circus, the Second Circuit held that an im-
porter's challenge to executive agreements made by the President
concerning footwear imports from China and Korea was within the
jurisdiction of the district court, although it was not within the
jurisdiction of the Customs Court.4 0 The Second Circuit justified
the need for the district court to exercise its original jurisdiction
by emphasizing the inadequacy of the Customs Service's protest
remedy under the circumstances:
Violation of these export limits subjects the foreign exporter to
heavy civil and criminal sanctions in the country of export. There
is accordingly every likelihood that the agreements will be effec-
tively enforced abroad, with the result that no occasion for pro-
test ... will ever present itself, and no Customs Court jurisdic-
tion ... will arise. 41
Shortly after the decision in Sneaker Circus, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia stated this inad-
equacy exception more explicitly in Davis Walker Corp. v. Blu-
menthal.42 Relying heavily upon Sneaker Circus, the Davis
Walker court declared that "[j]urisdiction lies in the federal court
over Customs-related matters where no adequate remedy exists in
8 566 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1977).
39 Senate Hearings on S. 2857, supra note 33, at 50, 60.
4o 566 F.2d at 399.
41 Id.
42 460 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1978).
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the Customs Court. '43 The district court therefore accepted juris-
diction to review the trigger price mechanism used by the Treasury
Department to enforce the Antidumping Act.44 Since "[m]ost for-
eign suppliers refused to sell . . . at prices below the trigger
prices,"45 the court explained, instigation of an antidumping inves-
tigation or the imposition of duties, one of which was a necessary
precondition to Customs Court jurisdiction over such a question,
was unlikely.
In Jerlian Watch Co. v. United States Department of Com-
merce,41 importers challenged a quota that limited the duty-free
importation of watches from United States possessions.47 They
claimed that they could not challenge the quota by the protest
method because payment of the duties that would be assessed
against them would drive them out of business.48 The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court decision to dismiss the importers'
petition, holding that the no "adequate remedy" exception could
be invoked only if the party seeking review could demonstrate un-
alterable or unavoidable detriment.49 The court concluded that
financial hardship was not sufficiently detrimental to justify appli-
cation of the inadequacy exception since the plaintiffs "[held] the
key to their remedy by choosing whether or not to import in excess
of their allocation and pursue a protest." 50 This fact distinguishes
13 Id. at 290.
44 Id.
45 Id.
4 597 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Jerlian Watch has been cited as support
for a restrictive interpretation of § 1581(i). See Cohen, supra note 1, at 770-71. But see
Vance, supra note 1, at 809-10 (pre-Act cases such as Jerlian Watch do not compel the
Court to interpret its jurisdiction under § 1581(i) restrictively). Nevertheless, it is submitted
that the Jerlian Watch court effectively conceded the propriety of the inadequate remedy
exception by attempting to limit it.
17 597 F.2d at 688. The quota that the importers challenged in Jerlian Watch "contem-
plate[d] a two-stage allocation process." Id. at 689. In the first stage, the annual quota of
watches that could be imported duty-free was to be divided among all eligible producers
based on the quantity of local income taxes and wages paid, and on the number of units
exported in the previous year. Id. In the second stage, the remainder of the quota was allo-
cated among watch assemblers who used at least 26 "discrete components" in the manufac-
ture of their watches, and made a specified wage contribution per watch movement. Id.
48 Id. at 691.
41 Id. at 692.
0 Id. The federal courts consistently have found in other administrative contexts that
financial hardship is not sufficiently injurious to justify an exception to the exhaustion of
remedies requirement. See, e.g., Barnes v. Chatterton, 515 F.2d 916, 921 (3d Cir. 1975)
(costs involved in pursuing administrative relief through Civil Service Commission do not
constitute irreparable injury and plaintiff is therefore required to exhaust available adminis-
[Vol. 58:839
1984] § 1581(i) JURISDICTION
Jerlian Watch from both Sneaker Circus and Davis Walker, in
which the plaintiffs lacked the ability to protest.5
Post-Act Case Law
From the outset, the Court of International Trade acknowl-
edged the importance of pre-Act case law in defining its "mani-
festly inadequate" standard. The Court first had the opportunity
to apply this standard in United States Cane Sugar Refiners' As-
sociation v. Block.2 In Cane Sugar Refiners' Association, the
plaintiff association attempted to challenge a presidential procla-
mation creating sugar importation quotas-without first filing a
protest-on the ground that the delay and expense inherent in us-
ing the protest remedy held "the potential for immediate injury
and irreparable harm" to both the sugar industry and the Ameri-
can economy.5 3 The Court agreed that the protest remedy was
manifestly inadequate under the circumstances and upheld the ex-
trative remedies before seeking judicial review); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. FTC, 380 F.2d 8, 10 (5th
Cir. 1967) (where plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies through FTC, judicial
intervention is not justified where injury sought to be avoided is merely normal cost of ad-
ministrative litigation); Allegheny Airlines v. Fowler, 261 F. Supp. 508, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(expense involved in submitting to administrative proceedings of the New York State Com-
mission for Human Rights is not sufficiently detrimental to justify judicial action without
exhaustion of administrative remedies).
51 See Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 566 F.2d 396, 399 (2d Cir. 1977); Davis Walker
Corp. v. Blumenthal, 460 F. Supp. 283, 290 (D.D.C. 1978); see also Timken Co. v. Simon,
539 F.2d 221, 225-26 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (refusing to hold that district court lacked juris-
diction to hear challenge to dumping finding since importer lacked Customs Court remedy);
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 143 (D.C. Cir.) (district
court jurisdiction existed because private enforcement of import restraints eliminated possi-
bility of protestable Customs decision being made), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1974). But
cf. J.C. Penney Co. v. United States Treasury Dep't, 439 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir.) (determina-
tion that case is not ripe for review by Customs Court since no protest can yet be filed does
not, of itself, vest the district court with jurisdiction), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
11 544 F. Supp. 883 (Ct. Int'l Trade), aff'd, 683 F.2d 399 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
13 544 F. Supp. at 886. In order to file a protest, the plaintiff association, comprised of
six major independent refiners of cane sugar in the United States, first would have had to
attempt to import sugar in excess of the quota established, solely to obtain a protestable
exclusion of the product from the entry under § 1514. Id. at 887. Under the Presidential
proclamation, Customs officials were required to exclude from entry any sugar in excess of
the established quotas. Id. The Customs officials reviewing a protest to this proclamation
would be powerless because they would have no authority to override the Presidential proc-
lamation. Id. Consequently, there was no relief available to plaintiffs at the administrative
level. Id. Judge Newman, writing for the Court, declared that it would be "totally unreason-
able-indeed, shocking-to require plaintiff's members" in this situation, to file a protest
before seeking judicial review of the validity of the proclamation. Id.
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ercise of jurisdiction .under section 1581(a). 4 Although at first
glance this decision may seem to disregard the limitation placed on
the inadequacy exception in Jerlian Watch, Cane Sugar Refiners'
Association is distinguishable becausethe injury alleged was not
solely to the importers, but also to the American economy as a
whole. 5 Furthermore, while this decision differs from the pre-Act
cases because harm to third parties is alleged, it is submitted that
Congress, in giving exclusive jurisdiction over international trade
matters to the Court, did not intend to deny the Court jurisdiction
to review an unprotested matter that posed serious danger to the
national economy.
Perhaps because Cane Sugar Refiners' Association appeared
to give an expansive interpretation to the Court's jurisdictional
statute, subsequent decisions of the Court and the Federal Circuit
have stressed the narrowness of the manifestly inadequate stan-
dard. 6 For example, in American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v.
United States,57 the Court rejected the argument that an im-
porter-without filing a protest-could challenge the imposition of
extra duties after goods were imported pursuant to "internal ad-
vice" that was subsequently revoked by Customs.5 ' The plaintiff
had attempted to show inadequacy by arguing that payment of the
additional duties would bankrupt it, and the Court, in keeping
with Jerlian Watch, observed that "where a litigant has access to
.. .[the] court under traditional means, such as [by filing a pro-
54 Id.
" See id.
" See Manufacture De Machines Du Haut-Rhin v. von Raab, 569 F. Supp. 877, 882-83
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). But see Special Commodity Group v. Baldridge, 575 F. Supp. 1288,
1291-92 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983) (plaintiff permitted to assert claim arising out of law of
imports).
"5 557 F. Supp. 605 (Ct. Int'l Trade), aff'd, 718 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1909 (1984).
51 557 F. Supp. at 608. The plaintiffs in American Air Parcel were involved in the im-
portation of clothing that was custom-made in Hong Kong for customers in the United
States who ordered the merchandise through American salesmen. American Air Parcel, 718
F.2d at 1547-48. The plaintiffs objected to the assessment of duties based on the sales price
paid by the consumer in the United States. Id. at 1548. They contended that the amount of
duty should be based on the payment in Hong Kong by distributors to tailors. Id. In re-
sponse to the importer's request for internal advice, the Customs Office of Regulations and
Rules declared that the duty should be assessed based on the transaction in Hong Kong
between the tailors and distributors. Id. The Customs Service, however, later revoked this
decision. Id. at 1549.
The American Air Parcel opinion followed the decision in United States v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 687 F.2d 467 (C.C.P.A. 1982). For a brief discussion of that opinion, see infra notes 60-
62 and accompanying text.
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test], it must avail itself of this avenue of approach complying with
all the relevant prerequisites thereto." 9 Similarly, in United
States v. Uniroyal, Inc.,60 the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals stressed the narrowness of the "manifestly inadequate" ex-
ception, 61 and Judge Nies' concurring opinion observed that the
exception was consistent with pre-Act case law.2 Finally, in Lowa,
Chief Judge Re concluded from the relevant case law that the in-
adequacy exception applies only to protestable matters when the
protest remedy is manifestly inadequate, or "when necessary...
because of special circumstances. ' '1 3
' 557 F. Supp. at 607. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Court's dismissal of the im-
porter's action for lack of jurisdiction. American Air Parcel, 718 F.2d at 1552-53. On appeal,
the importer raised two arguments: first, that payment of the additional duties assessed
would drive the importer into bankruptcy, and thus it could not use the protest remedy;
and, second, that the § 1581(a) remedy did not comport with due process under the circum-
stances. Id. at 1549-50. The Federal Circuit dismissed the first argument in terms similar to
those used by the Court of International Trade. Compare 557 F. Supp. at 607-08 with 718
F.2d at 550-52. With respect to the importer's constitutional arguments, the court held that
the mere allegation of a constitutional violation did not suffice to render the protest remedy
"manifestly inadequate," since if this were the case, § 1581(a) could be circumvented merely
by casting challenges in constitutional language. Id. at 1550. Moreover, the court held that
the delays implicated in the protest procedure did not violate the importer's due process
rights, particularly since the importer had increased the time necessary for disposition of
protests by seeking additional administrative review. Id. at 1551.
60 687 F.2d 467 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
6, See id. at 471-72. The Uniroyal court noted: "The jurisdiction of the Court of Inter-
national Trade under § 1581(i) is expressly 'in addition to the jurisdiction conferred . . . by
subsections (a)-(h),' andthe legislative history of § 1581 further evidences Congress' inten-
tion that subsection (i) not be used generally to bypass administrative review by meaningful
protest." Id. at 472. In Uniroyal, Customs issued notices of redelivery to an importer be-
cause it had not marked its goods with the country of origin. Id. at 468 & n.2. The importer
responded with a request for an internal advice concerning whether an exception to the
marking requirement applied. Id. at 468. The reply was in the negative, and the importer
based its action upon it. Id. at 469. The Court, however, denied the' Government's motion to
dismiss on the ground that, by answering the request for internal advice, Customs had made
a final decision concerning the applicability of the marking statute. Id. at 469. Since Cus-
toms would thus have to deny any protest subsequently filed, the filing of a protest would
be a meaningless gesture, and jurisdiction existed under § 1581(i). Id. at 469-70. The issue
was certified for interlocutory appeal and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals re-
versed on the ground that an "internal advice" ruling could not be reviewed pursuant to §
1581(i). Id. at 472.
6'2 See id. at 475 & n.9 (Nies, J., concurring), Judge Nies believed that the legislative
history of the Act foreclosed any judicial review of an internal advice. See id. at 475 (Nies,
J., concurring). Although the notices of delivery might have been reviewable under § 1581(i)
if the protest remedy were shown to be "manifestly inadequate," no such inadequacy was
shown. Id. (Nies, J., concurring). For that reason, Judge Nies concurred in the court's deci-
sion. See id. (Nies, J., concurring).
63 561 F. Supp. at 447. Chief Judge Re emphasized the judicial deference due the ad-
ministrative process: "Whether the question to be decided is factual or 'strictly legal,' the
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A DEFENSE OF THE LOWA STANDARD
The language in the foregoing opinions suggests, it is submit-
ted, an effort by the Court both to accept cases that previously
would have been heard by the district courts under the "no ade-
quate remedy" exception and to stay within the limits mandated
by section 1581. Moreover, by adopting the stance it has taken in
interpreting section 1581, it is suggested that the Court has acted
consistently with the legislative history of the Customs Courts Act.
Nevertheless, the articles in this Symposium by Messrs. Cohen
and Vance indicate that the Lowa standard has influential critics.
Cohen's position is that the "in addition to" language of section
1581(i) makes that section a grant of jurisdiction entirely separate
from the grants of jurisdiction contained in sections 1581(a)-(h) 4
This view necessarily assumes that the Court has acted beyond its
powers in applying the "manifestly inadequate" standard, since it
assumes that potentially protestable matters must come within the
jurisdictional grant of section 1581(a) if they are to come before
the Court at all.6 5 Vance, by contrast, maintains that the Court's
power to excuse the filing of a protest is at least as great as was the
power of the district courts to do so before passage of the Act.6 6 He
contends, however, that the grant of jurisdiction embodied in sec-
tion 1581(i)(4) authorizes the Court to hear potentially protestable
matters in which the protest remedy would cause hardship to the
aggrieved party, so long as a case or controversy is shown to exist.
67
This view asserts that Lowa takes too constrained a view of the
judicial respect due the administrative process requires that the decision should be made in
the first instance by the administrative agency to whom Congress has delegated the respon-
sibility of administering the statutory plan." Id. Citing Uniroyal with approval, Chief Judge
Re observed that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' refusal to use § 1581(i) to
circumvent the normal administrative review process comported with established precedent.
See id. at 446.
64 See Cohen, supra note 1, at 772-73.
" See id. at 70, 771-72. Cohen admits that his interpretation assumes that "jurisdiction
exists under § 1581(i) only if it does not or could not exist under some other subsection of §
1581," id. at 772, but cites direct support for this position, see infra note 75 and accompany-
ing text.
66 See Vance, supra note 1, at 798.
See id. at 798-99. Vance's proposed standard focuses on whether the matter is ripe
for decision, and de-emphasizes the need to prevent improper circumvention of the protest
remedy. See id. Vance contends that focusing on whether a case is ripe for decision rather
than on the applicability of § 1581(a) is more in harmony with the legislative intent and
"would not lead to the judicialization of the administration of customs laws." Id.
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Court's jurisdiction. 8
It is suggested that both Cohen's and Vance's interpretations
of section 1581(i) are unjustifiably extreme: Cohen's view depends
on an interpretation of section 1581(a) that contradicts the plain
meaning of that statute and of section 2637(d), while Vance's view
ignores the express intent of the legislature not to create new
causes of action in passing the Customs Courts Act.
Based on the "in addition to" language of section 1581(i), Co-
hen characterizes section 1581 as embodying nine discrete grants
of jurisdiction to the Court. 9 A case that is embraced by the terms
of a particular section, he contends, may not be heard by the Court
unless the jurisdictional prerequisites of that section are met.70
This construction of section 1581 causes no problems except in
regard to potentially protestable matters. Section 1581(a), as was
previously noted, applies only to actions brought to contest the de-
nial of a protest.71 Cohen, however, argues that section 1581(a) in-
cludes both protestable and protested matters, even though
protestable matters may not actually be heard by the Court until a
protest is filed and denied.7 2 According to Cohen, the fact that
these claims could be protested excludes them from the purview of
section 1581(i).73
The simple response to this argument is that it ignores the
language of sections 1581(a) and 2627(d). Section 1581(a) says
nothing about compelling protestable matters that are not pro-
tested to be protested, and section 2637(d) gives the Court discre-
tion to determine when exhaustion of remedies is appropriate ex-
6 See id. at 811.
'9 See Cohen, supra note 1, at 701.
70 Id. Cohen notes that civil actions brought pursuant to § 1581(a) cannot be heard
unless the jurisdictional requirements have been fulfilled and a protest has been filed by the
plaintiff. See id. at 702.
7, See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
72 See Cohen, supra note 1, at 756-57. Cohen's argument relies upon cases in which the
plaintiffs made a good faith effort to comply with the statutory requirements. See id. In
these cases, each court found sufficient compliance because the legislative intent behind the
prerequisites had been fulfilled. See, e.g., Dynasty Footwear v. United States, 551 F. Supp.
1138, 1141 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982) (Court determined that jurisdiction was proper where Gov-
ernment had possession of funds belonging to plaintiff prior to institution of suit because,
while there was no actual compliance with statutory requirements, purpose of those require-
ments had been satisfied); Eddietron, Inc. v. United States, 493 F. Supp. 585, 590 (Cust. Ct.
1980) (partial payment of a promissory note tendered to cover the amount due on six as-
sessed entries satisfied legislative intent of duty payment prerequisite as to one entry for
jurisdictional purposes).
73 Cohen, supra note 1, at 761 and text accompanying note 360.
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cept in cases covered by sections 1581(a), (b), or (h).14 This is not
to say, however, that Cohen's argument that the statute contains
nine discrete jurisdictional grants is necessarily incorrect.75 Section
1581(i), even if it is construed to include potentially protestable
matters, remains a jurisdictional basis "in addition to" section
1581(a) because potentially protestable matters do not come within
the terms of section 1581(a) or of any other subsection of section
1581.
More importantly, Cohen's construction of section 1581 con-
flicts with the primary legislative purpose, which was to bring in-
ternational trade cases previously heard by the district courts
within the jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade. It is
clear that Congress intended cases such as Sneaker Circus and Da-
vis Walker to remain reviewable after passage of the Customs
Courts Act.76 Since the Act precludes the district courts from hear-
ing international trade cases, however, Cohen's view effectively de-
prives such cases of a forum.
It is submitted that Cohen does not satisfactorily respond to
this objection. Instead, he asserts that construing section 1581(i) to
embrace potentially protestable matters infringes the integrity of
section 1581(a) and accords section 1581(i) an importance Congress
did not intend.77 This argument, however, assumes that potentially
74 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(a), 2637(d) (1982); see also supra notes 6-17 and accompany-
ing text (Court permitted to exercise jurisdiction in unprotested matters).
71 See infra note 77. Cohen cites several cases in support of the proposition that a rul-
ing that can be protested must be protested to come within the jurisdiction of the Court.
See, e.g., Consumers Union of United States v. Committee for the Implementation of Tex-
tile Agreements, 561 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1977).
Consumers Union, a case decided before the passage of the Act, reversed a district court
ruling that granted summary judgment on Consumers Union's challenge of a textile quota
program. 561 F.2d at 873. Although it was questionable whether Consumers Union, a non-
profit organization that purchased only $15,000 worth of textiles for testing purposes annu-
ally, would have standing, see id. at 874, the court did not base its decision on that ground,
see id. Instead, it reversed on the ground that
if anyone wishes to challenge the Committee's action, he can do so as other chal-
lenges of that nature are made. . . [Customs decisions] are final unless the person
aggrieved files a protest with the Collector. Upon its denial, he may bring an ac-
tion contesting the refusal. . . . This exclusiveness is buttressed by 28 U.S.C. §
1340 which gives "original jurisdiction of any civil action . . ." to the District
Court, "except matters within the jurisdiction of the Customs Court."
Id. (emphasis in original); see American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States, 718
F.2d 1546, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1909 (1984).
71 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
" Cohen, supra note 1, at 770-72. As substantiation for the proposition that subsection
(i) was intended to represent a grant of jurisdiction independent of the other subsections of
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protestable matters come within section 1581(a), an interpretation
that is refuted by the legislative history and the plain language of
the statute. The weakness of this argument is further demon-
strated by the lack of any support for it from the legislative history
or any other source.
§ 1581, Cohen cites the following remarks of Rep. McClory during the House debate on the
Act:
Simply put, subsection (i) is the embodiment of the principle that if a cause
of action involving an import transaction exists, other than as provided for in sub-
sections (a)-(h) of proposed section 1581, then that cause of action should be insti-
tuted in the U.S. Court of International Trade rather than the Federal district
courts or courts of appeal.
Cohen, supra note 1, at 791 n.502 (quoting 126 CONG. REc. 26,554 (1980)). This statement
comports with others that occur throughout the legislative history. See supra notes 33-37
and accompanying text.
" Although this is not made explicit, Cohen's main support for his interpretation of the
Act as applied to potentially protestable matters lies in Consumers Union of United States
v. Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, 561 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1977) and the American Air Parcel cases. See supra
note 75. It is submitted, however, that these cases are easily distinguishable from Sneaker
Circus and Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n. See supra notes 38-41 & 52-54 and accompanying
text. Consumers Union, for example, was not a case in which the protest remedy was inade-
quate, This conclusion is supported by the manner in which the opinion distinguished Con-
sumers Union of United States v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1004 (1975):
I ]n that case, the "voluntary import restraint undertakings" were not legally
binding and could not be implemented by the Customs Service. There could, as a
result, never have been a decision by a Customs official upholding the restraint
and opening up the protest procedure which affords access to the Customs Court.
Consumers Union, 561 F.2d at 874 (citations omitted). The American Air Parcel cases are
even more inapposite, since the importer in those cases filed protests before approaching the
Court. See supra note 75.
In addition, it is submitted that a second legislative purpose further refutes Cohen's
position. The Customs Courts Act was also meant to eliminate discrepancies between the
administrative review procedure followed by the Customs Service and the procedures fol-
lowed by other agencies subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. See House Hearings
on H.R. 6394, supra note 37, at 9 (Statement of Chief Judge Re). Chief Judge Re summa-
rized two purposes of the Act as follows:
[T]he bill . . . will establish as matters of legislative policy two significant juris-
prudential concepts pertaining to disputes arising out of agency actions affecting
importations: . . [that Customs will be] made subject to the same policy of judi-
cial review as Congress has provided for other administrative agencies; and [that]
persons adversely affected or aggrieved by agency actions arising out of import
transactions are entitled to the same access to judicial review and judicial reme-
dies as Congress has made available for persons aggrieved by actions of other
agencies.
Id. By declaring a group of previously reviewable cases unreviewable, and, by implication,
restricting the Court's power to excuse the exhaustion requirement in an appropriate case, it
is submitted that Cohen introduces an unjustifiable discrepancy into the process of appeal-
ing a Customs Service ruling.
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Cohen's second argument against the Lowa standard is that it
is too vague to be workable.79 Although it is suggested that this
argument is more meritorious than the statutory language argu-
ment, it too overlooks relevant considerations of legislative pur-
pose. The inadequacy exception was criticized for creating undue
confusion before the Act was passed. 0 However, much of this con-
fusion stemmed from the fact that the standard was being applied
by both the Customs Court and the various district courts.8 With
the elimination of district court jurisdiction over international
trade cases, this source of potential confusion has vanished. More-
over, though broad, the standard is certainly workable, since it was
used for years by the district courts before the Act became law.
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Cases handed down both before and after passage of the Act have
uniformly declared the inadequate remedy exception to be a nar-
row one and have applied it accordingly. 3 It is submitted that
there is little reason to fear that this exception will swallow the
exhaustion rule.
In contradistinction to Cohen, Vance's position is, in large
measure, in harmony with the Lowa standard. His primary criti-
cism of Lowa is that by applying the manifestly inadequate stan-
11 See Cohen, supra note 1, at 709.
80 See Cohen, supra note 36, at 473-76. Under the Customs Courts Act of 1970, district
courts could hear only cases outside the jurisdiction of the Customs Court. The district
courts interpreted their jurisdiction to require an inquiry into the possibilities of bringing
the action in the Customs Court. This inquiry required the district court to determine
whether "the administrative action challenged in the suit could conceivably form the basis
for an administrative protest," which then, if denied, would satisfy the statutory jurisdic-
tional requirements of the Customs Court. Cohen, supra note 36, at 474. In many instances,
there being no administrative decision on point, it was difficult to determine whether the
action could have been protested and therefore brought in the Customs Court. Id.; see H.
REP. No. 1235, supra note 35, at 33.
"' See Jerlian Watch Co. v. Department of Commerce, 597 F.2d 687, 690-91 (9th Cir.
1979) (per curiam); SCM Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 549 F.2d 812, 821
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Cohen, supra note 36, at 475-77.
82 See Cornet Stores v. Morton, 632 F.2d 96, 99 (9th Cir. 1980) (available remedies are
not inadequate merely because more desirable remedies are available in another court), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 937 (1981); Jerlian Watch Co. v. Department of Commerce, 597 F.2d 687,
692 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (financial impossibility does not render available remedy
inadequate); Barclay Indus. v. Carter, 494 F. Supp. 912, 913-14 (D.D.C. 1980) (available
remedies are not inadequate because more desirable remedies or procedures are available in
a district court). See generally supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
83 See, e.g., Jerlian Watch Co. v. Department of Commerce, 597 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir.
1979) (per curiam) (pre-Act case law); United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block,
544 F. Supp. 883, 887 (Ct. Int'l Trade), aff'd, 683 F.2d 399 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (post-Act case
law).
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dard, the Court failed to exercise all the jurisdiction granted to it
by section 1581(i). 4 He contends that since application of the ex-
ceptions to the exhaustion requirement no longer invokes ques-
tions about the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, pre-Act cases
do not bind the Court to interpret those exceptions restrictively. s5
Suggesting that language in the legislative history requires section
1581(i) to be read broadly to expand the Court's jurisdiction and
to further the objectives of the Act,8 6 Vance proposes a new stan-
dard for determining reviewability of protestable matters. Namely,
any case in which a final decision has been made by the Customs
Service and which is ripe for decision-in the sense that a contro-
versy demonstrably exists-would be reviewable by the Court pur-
suant to section 1581(i). 7 In other words, Vance would extend the
jurisdiction of the Court to cases the district courts previously re-
jected as unreviewable under the exhaustion of remedies
requirement.
There are, it is suggested, several problems with Vance's posi-
tion. First, like Cohen's view, Vance's interpretation ignores the
legislative intention to conform review standards for Customs Ser-
vice rulings to those applied to rulings of other agencies.8  More
importantly, Vance's interpretation allows previously unreviewable
rulings to be heard by the Court, and thus conflicts with the ex-
pressed intent in the legislative history that no new causes of ac-
tion were to be created. Vance's response to this charge is that
since the protestability of a ruling no longer defines the Court's
jurisdiction over it, pre-Act case law applying the exhaustion re-
quirement no longer applies to the Court. 9 Aside from the fact
that it remains questionable whether the Act's passage makes
protestability irrelevant to the issue of the Court's subject matter
jurisdiction, 0 the primary purpose of the Act was to remove trade
8 See Vance, supra note 1, at 812.
See id. at 806 nn.60-62 and accompanying text.
8 See id. at 810. Vance cites Sacilor, Acieries et Laminoirs de Lorraine v. United
States, 542 F. Supp. 1020 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982), as an example of a broad interpretation of
the Court's jurisdiction. Vance, supra note 1, at 811 nn.84-87 and accompanying text.
87 See Vance, supra note 1, at 810.
"' See H. REP. No. 1235, supra note 35, at 45. The Act was designed to provide ag-
grieved parties in import transactions the same judicial review and judicial remedies availa-
ble to parties aggrieved by other agencies. Id.
89 See Vance, supra note 1, at 802.
11 See 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) (1982). The language of § 2637(d) makes plain that its per-
mission to the Court in regard to the exhaustion requirement does not apply to cases in
which § 1581(a) is applicable. See id. Moreover, the legislative history appears to substanti-
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cases from the district courts' jurisdiction. 91 It was to permit this
to be done without excluding previously reviewable matters from
judicial review that the Act expanded the Court's jurisdiction.92 To
argue that the Court's jurisdiction should be expanded even fur-
ther is, in effect, to create new causes of action, which Congress
expressly refused to do.
As a matter of policy, it is suggested that Vance's standard is
vague and unworkable. Under existing case law, there are no clear
constitutional principles for deciding when a case or controversy
exists in situations in which no protest has been filed.93 More im-
portantly, Vance's standard permits cases that would ordinarily be
handled under section 1581(a) to be handled under section 1581(i).
These sections have different statutes of limitation, standing re-
quirements, and burdens of proof.9 To allow the Court to ignore
the exhaustion requirement and interchange cases between these
two sections is to build inequity into the jurisdictional scheme of
section 1581. It would be more equitable, it is suggested, to permit
the Customs Service to resolve impasses concerning the
protestability of particular cases by formulating new administra-
tive guidelines than to permit the Court to countenance forum
shopping by abrogating the Lowa standard.
CONCLUSION
The Lowa standard comports with traditional principles of re-
viewability of administrative rulings, as well as with the legislative
purposes behind the Customs Courts Act. Moreover, it strikes a
ate Cohen's assertion that § 1581(i) was not meant to apply if § 1581(a) did. See, e.g., 126
CONG. REC. 26,553 (1980) (remarks of Rep. McClory). Therefore, it is submitted that a po-
tentially protestable matter must either come within subsection (i) or be protested to fall
within the Court's jurisdiction.
91 See supra note 80.
92 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
Cf. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Pitman, 520 F. Supp. 1225, 1227 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981)
(Court determined jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) without looking into
existence of a controversy); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 505 F. Supp. 216, 218 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1980) (jurisdictional discussion is contained in two sentences in which Court
simply states that jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i)); Sanho Collections, Ltd. v.
Chasen, 505 F. Supp 204, 208 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980) (Court determined, without inquiry into
constitutional principles, that jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) where no
protest could be filed).
9 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2631(a) (1982) (standing) and id. § 2636(a) (time for commenc-
ing an action) and id. § 2639(a) (burden of proof) with 28 U.S.C. § 2631(i) (standing) and
id. § 2636(i) (time for commencing an action) and id. § 2639(i) (burden of proof generally).
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reasonable balance between the need to maintain the integrity of
the protest mechanism and the need to afford aggrieved importers
an appropriate forum for dispute resolution. It is hoped that the
Court and the Federal Circuit will continue to develop and apply
the prudent standard they have established. 5
St. Thomas More Institute
for Legal Research
11 Recent decisions continue to follow the Lowa standard. See, e.g., Luggage & Leather
Goods Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. United States, No. 84-53, slip op. at 115-17 (Ct. Int'l Trade May
11, 1984) (jurisdiction under § 1581(i) is proper where exhaustion of remedies would be
manifestly inadequate); Vivitar Corp. v. United States, No. 84-37, slip op. at 70 (Ct. Int'l
Trade Apr. 4, 1984) (1581(i) jurisdiction is proper where protest could be filed but the pro-
test remedy would be manifestly inadequate); see also American Ass'n of Exporters & Im-
porters v. United States, No. 84-21, slip op. at 36-38 (Ct. Int'l Trade Mar. 14, 1984) (noting
that filing a protest is not an essential precondition to subsection (i) jurisdiction and distin-
guishing Uniroyal).
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